


It is difficult to deal with these recommendations because it is not so much the proposed functions for OCI that are objectionable as the inferential abandonment of functions implied and in recommendation 3 the inference that the size of OCI could be drastically cut.


OCI as at present constituted may be broken down functionally as follows:  
25X1A1a



The COMINT Policy, Security, and USCIB Secretariat personnel would be eliminated from OCI if recommendations 5-7 and 22-25 were adopted. The inadvisability of doing so is considered elsewhere in this response. Moreover these positions would not be saved but would merely be transferred to another part of the Agency.

The NIC slots and those attached to ORR (to assist that office in producing current items from its study of the Soviet Bloc economy) are apparently found necessary and are believed indispensable by me.

That leaves the substantive all-source current intelligence producing component of the office, the core and bulk of which consist of its area analysts. The present breakdown of those (shown graphically on the attached map) may be tabulated as follows:  
25X9A2



TOP SECRET

As you are well aware, the support you require in preparing briefings for the Council and the preparation of even the limited type publications proposed by the IG could not be satisfactorily handled with fewer analysts. For the amount of material classified and otherwise that must be scanned and studied, our analysts are, if anything, spread too thin. For example within the past year I have directed AD/CI to employ an additional analyst to concentrate exclusively on [REDACTED] rather than have these areas treated as a sideshow by our [REDACTED] expert.

25X9A2

25X9A2

If the need for an analytical force of approximately this size is granted, it seems to me to follow that each of these individuals should be as widely useful to the intelligence community and the National Security Council Departments as possible. This would not be the case if the analysts remained inactive and/or sat monk-like on the results of their studies except when they turned up an item of sufficient significance to be read by or orally presented to the NSC. I have, therefore, approved and believe you should also endorse the current practice whereby the results of their research are published currently and succinctly in the OCI Digest and Weekly for the benefit of the working levels of CIA and interested agencies. The incremental cost of producing this continual useful product as compared with merely maintaining the analyst in the stand-by status has been computed at a mere \$18,000 a year. See also comments on recommendations 9-12.

Now to turn to the specific subparagraphs of recommendation 2:

- (a) The Daily Bulletin and the Weekly are more fully discussed under headings 8 and 11. Suffice it to say here that they are believed tailored for high level consumers and are rigorously kept down in size and number of items handled to that end.
- (b) No comment
- (c) Concur but note that many important requesters of briefings such as Mr. Robert Sprague and General Doolittle in recent months want an independent check on the material they may receive from the IAC agencies of primary concern. To refuse to satisfy such requests would place the Agency in a very embarrassing position.
- (d) Concur but note that this is done most efficiently and regularly through the medium of the Current Intelligence Digest and Weekly.
- (e) Either the Director or I have invariably approved any additional research project undertaken by OCI. Every effort is made to see that the office does not get involved in research that could more appropriately be performed by another agency, e.g. the Director's recent request for a summary of Soviet over-flights of free world territory was subcontracted to the Air Force, and many projects dealing with current economic or political trends in the free world have been turned over informally to the Department of State.

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(f) Concur

(g) Concur [with this comment: It is all very well to prohibit OCI from engaging in estimating, and the management of OCI makes every effort to avoid slipping over into this field; however, it is essential that spot items be read particularly by high level consumers in the proper context and this requires the furnishing by OCI of appropriate comment which to some purists may of necessity contain an element of forecast. It seems to me that this is unavoidable because situations of intelligence interest are rarely static and therefore a proper description inherently involves past, present and likely future developments. I have personally made a major effort to improve coordination between ONE and OCI and am pleased to report that ONE now regards OCI's efforts in this field, as not only legitimate but more important carefully coordinated and consistent with the work and views of the Board of Estimates. See attached copy of memorandum from Dr. Kent.]

Recommendation 3:

There is no objection to having the Management Staff survey OCI at any time. A revised T/O is currently before DD/S and any examination he or his staff may make in order to point out ways in which the functions of OCI can be conducted with fewer people or less money would be welcome. But I cannot accept without protest a direction to DD/S to survey OCI and cut its T/O to fit the misconceived mission and function that are envisaged in paragraph 2 and elsewhere in the IG Report.

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